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THE DECLINING MIRANDA DOCTRINE: THE
SUPREME COURT'S DEVELOPMENT OF MIRANDA
ISSUES
Miranda v. Arizona' measurably altered the standard for admission of
incriminating statements in criminal trials. Prior to Miranda, statements
elicited through interrogation of a defendant were admissible if they were
made voluntarily. Voluntariness was determined by examining the
"totality of the circumstances."' 2 The Miranda majority reasoned that the
inherently coercive setting of custodial interrogation 3 required greater pro-
tection for the defendant than the voluntariness standard provided.,
Miranda held that in order to protect adequately the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination, warnings which
explicitly set out the defendant's rights must be administered before cus-
todial interrogation may begin. 5 Adequate warnings, together with an
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Courts examined the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a statement
had been made voluntarily. All of the events surrounding the interrogation were scrutinized
to ensure that the defendant's fifth amendment right agginst self-incrimination had not been
violated. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433, 440-41 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-24 (1959). Until 1963, confes-
sions in state court proceedings were judged also by the totality of the circumstances and
declared involuntary if they violated the due process standard of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). The Supreme Court's decision in
Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963) altered this by declaring the fifth amendment applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 8. The voluntariness standard served
two major purposes: to deter the police from improper conduct during interrogation, Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961), and to ensure the reliability of the evidence. Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
Miranda applies only to those defendants who are in custody. The majority deemed
an individual to be in custody if he had either been taken into physical custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444.
' The voluntariness test had already been augmented by earlier Supreme Court cases
and by congressional action. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), together with
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), excluded confessions obtained after unneces-
sary delay in arraignment. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) codifies the McNabb-
Mallory rule. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
And Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1 (1958). In addition to these safeguards, Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) held that statements elicited from a defendant outside the presence
of retained counsel were inadmissible. Further, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) held
inadmissible statements obtained without allowing a suspect under arrest to consult with
retained counsel. See generally Developments In The Law - Confessions, 79 HA{v. L. REv.
935, 999-1000 (1966).
Many commentators viewed the Miranda decision as an extension of Escobedo, as well
as a solution for the problems raised by inconsistent lower court decisions applying Escobedo.
384 U.S. at 440 n.1; see Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation?". California's Anticipa-
tory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 59, 59 n.2&3 (1966).
The Miranda Court mandated, that unless other effective procedures were developed
by Congress or the States, an individual in custody must be warned that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, that he has the right to have
counsel present, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. 384
U.S. at 467-73.
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effective waiver were deemed to be prerequisites for admissibility of in-
criminating statements made during custodial interrogation., Under
Miranda, a defendant who was informed of his rights could waive them,
although the government would have the burden of proving a knowing and
intelligent waiver before subsequent statements could be used against the
defendant.'
Since 1966, courts have struggled with ambiguities raised by the
Miranda decision. As a result, inconsistent lower court decisions have
made it difficult for law enforcement officers to determine when warnings
are required and how the warnings proscribe their subsequent conduct.8
The Supreme Court has attempted further to define the parameters of
permissible police conduct under Miranda by issuing opinions analyzing
the proper use of statements obtained without adequate warnings, the
scope of permissible police behavior after the defendant has exercised his
right to counsel or right to remain silent, and the meaning of custodial
interrogation.9 A number of these recent opinions have narrowed the appl-
icability of Miranda by giving new life to the voluntariness test in certain
circumstances." Other post-Miranda decisions interpreting the custody
requirement and determining when interrogation may resume following a
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent have failed to create clear
guidelines which lower courts require to reach consistent results."
In Harris v. New York" the Court considered whether a defendant's
Congress attempted to weaken Miranda's effectiveness by enacting section 3501 of title
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976). Section 3501 declares that voluntary statements obtained from
a defendant are admissible in evidence. The Miranda warnings are considered as factors to
be weighed in determining whether the defendant's statement was voluntary. The absence
or presence of any particular factor is not considered conclusive on the voluntariness issue.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1976). The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
section 3501, and the lower courts and prosecutors have been reluctant to use section 3501 to
determine the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant, relying instead on the
Miranda guidelines. See Gandara, Admissibility Of Confessions In Federal Prosecutions:
Implementation Of Section 3501 By Law Enforcement Officials And The Courts, 63 GEO. L.J.
305, 313-14 (1974).
384 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 475, citing, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See generally Dix, Waiver in
Criminal Procedure: A Brief For More Careful Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REv. 193 (1977); Rothblatt
& Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go from Here?, 42
NomE DAME LAW. 479 (1967); Note, Government Can Satisfy Its Burden of Proving Waiver
of Miranda Rights by Showing Warnings Given, Signed Waiver, and Proof of Defendant's
Capacity to Understand the Warnings, 26 VAND. L. Rsv. 1069 (973); Current Miranda Issues,
Fourth Circuit Review, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 492 (1978).
A case-by-case approach employed by lower courts in many instances has meant that
police have been left without solid guidelines. In other areas, lower court decisions have been
in direct conflict. The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve many of these conflicts
through its post-Miranda holdings. See text accompanying notes 43-54 & 70-82, infra.
I Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
20 See text accompanying notes 12-42 infra.
1 See text accompanying notes 43-82 infra.
12 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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statements, acquired after improper Miranda warnings, could be used at
trial for impeachment purposes. The defendant in Harris was charged with
selling heroin to an undercover officer. At trial, the defendant took the
stand and admitted making a sale of baking powder to the officer as a
scheme to defraud the buyer. 13 On cross-examination, the prosecution in-
troduced incriminating statements made by the defendant after he had
received inadequate Miranda warnings." The trial court instructed the
jury that the statements could not be used in determiningthe defendant's
guilt or innocence, but only to evaluate his credibility."
In appealing his conviction, the defendant argued that Miranda barred
the use for any purpose of any statements obtained, absent full warnings,
during custodial interrogation. Conceding the Miranda opinion could be
read to bar such statements even for impeachment purposes, the Harris
majority nevertheless concluded that Miranda only barred the prosecution
from using improperly obtained statements obtained from its case-in-
chief." Thus, the Court held permissible the use of a defendant's state-
ments for impeachment purposes if the defendant elects to testify, pro-
vided the statements were made voluntarily.
The Harris majority compared Miranda's fifth amendment exclusion-
ary rule with the judicially created fourth axpendment exclusionary rule"8
and concluded that there were no substantial differences in purpose or
application. 9 Relying on an earlier Supreme Court holding"0 that evidence
' Id. at 223.
" Id. at 223-24. The police failed to warn defendant that he had the right to appointed
counsel if he could not afford one. Id. at 224. The defendant in Harris received the other three
warnings required by Miranda. The warnings are set out in note 5 supra.
" 401 U.S. at 223.
" Id. at 224. Evidence used in the prosecution's case-in-chief may be considered by the
jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Evidence inadmissible in the case-
in-chief but allowed for impeachment purposes is to be considered by the jury for the narrow
purpose of judging the defendant's credibility and not as a basis for its determination of the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. See 1 WHARTON'S CIMINAL EVMENCE § 161, at 294 (13th
ed. 1972).
401 U.S. at 226.
" Id. at 224-25. The fourth amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To protect that right, the Court held in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the
fourth amendment would be excluded from a federal prosecution. Id. at 398. The fourth
amendment exclusionary rule was later applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Mapp Court concluded that the fourth
amendment would be meaningless without the judicially created exclusionary rule. Id. at 658.
" 401 U.S. at 224-25. The Harris majority viewed the main purpose of the Miranda
exclusionary rule as deterrence of improper police conduct. Id. at 225.
" Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Two years before the criminal activity at
issue in Walder took place, the defendant had been the subject of an unlawful search which
led to the seizure of heroin. Following indictment, the defendant succeeded in suppressing
the evidence and the indictment was dismissed. The Walder case involved an unrelated drug
charge against the same individual. In Walder, the defendant testified that he had never
possessed any narcotics. The Walder majority allowed the prosecution to impeach the defen-
dant by introducing the testimony of an officer who took part in the earlier unlawful search
and seizure and the testimony of the chemist who analyzed the heroin. Id. at 64.
1979]
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obtained in violation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule could be
used for impeachment, the Harris Court held that statements obtained
from a defendant who had not been warned of his right to appointed
counsel are admissible on the issue of the defendant's credibility.', Addi-
tionally, the Court supported its holding by noting that the defendant
should not be allowed to commit perjury free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent statements.2 If statements obtained in violation of
Miranda were barred absolutely from trial, the defendant could testify
knowing that such statements could not be used against him in any man-
ner. Thus, the Harris Court concluded that Miranda was not to be used
as a shield by the defendant.
The Harris majority acknowledged the possible effects of their decision,
noting the remote chance of increased police misbehavior in future interro-
gations.? The police might, for example, knowingly-fail to give adequate
warnings in the hope of eliciting statements from a defendant that he
would not make following complete warnings. Although the ill-gotten
statements would be inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, such
statements, under Harris, would be admissible for impeachment purposes.
The Harris Court concluded, however, that the danger of such a specula-
tive possibility was far outweighed by the benefits gained by allowing the
evidence for impeachment to aid the jury in its evaluation of the defen-
dant's credibility.zA
The impeachment use of evidence in Walder was limited, therefore, to collateral matters.
The Walder Court carefully distinguished the factual situation before them from the fifth
amendment issue presented in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). In Agnello, the
prosecution sought to introduce the illegally obtained narcotics that were the subject of the
possession charge for which the defendant was currently being tried. The Agnello majority
prohibited such use of the illegally obtained evidence on grounds that it denied the defendant
his fifth amendment rights. Id. at 34-35. Walder was consistent with Agnello since the im-
peachment in Walder was collateral to the crime charged. The statements admitted for
impeachment purposes in Harris, however, contradicted statements the defendant made
concerning the sale of the contents of a glassine bag to the undercover officer, thus going to
the essence of the crime charged. 401 U.S. at 222-23.
Chief Justice Burger, when Circuit Judge, expressed views on the collateral matter issue
in Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burger, J., dissenting). Judge
Burger indicated his unwillingness to apply the collateral use doctrine of Walder to a Harris
situation. Dissenting in Lockley, Burger suggested a three-part test that must be met before
evidence obtained in violation of fifth amendment procedure safeguards could be offered to
impeach a defendant. The third requirement was that statements could not be used to
discredit the defendant if they admit the very acts which are essential elements of the crime
charged. Id. at 919. Chief Justice Burger has yet to explain the inconsistent positions he
adopted in Lockley and Harris. For a more detailed examination of the collateral use doctrine,
see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YmAz L.J. 1198, 1211-13 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Dershowitz & Ely]; Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder To Miranda,
62 Nw. U.L. Rav. 912 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Collateral Use Doctrine].
21 401 U.S. at 226.
21 Id. at 225.
z2 Id.
2A Id. The Harris majority stated that sufficient deterrence would be gained by exclusion
of the evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief. Id.
[Vol. XXXVI
MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Court's reasoning in Harris failed to recognize that the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule differs substantially from its fourth amend-
ment counterpart. The dissimilarities require that a different analysis be
applied to determine whether evidence obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment should be completely excluded at trial.n Thefirst major dif-
ference is that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a judicial crea-
tion while the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is constitutionally
based.28 Statements obtained in violation of Miranda must be excluded
from trial to avoid violation of the defendant's constitutional right against
self-incrimination.2
Evidence obtained through a violation of the fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is excluded from trial,
but not by constitutional command.? The evidence is inadmissible be-
cause the Supreme Court decided that the fourth amendment protection
would be more effective if the prosecution was denied the availability of
the ill-gotten evidence at trial.? A second difference is that while the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies generally to physical evi-
dence, the fifth amendment covers statements elicited from a defendant
under the pressures of custodial interrogation. Consequently, the relia-
bility of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is greater
21 The Harris Court's failure to recognize differences between the fourth and fifth amend-
ment exclusionary rules is consistent with its reluctance to note that Walder was concerned
with a violation of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule. See 401 U.S. at 224-25. Circuit
court cases which concluded that Walder was inapplicable to the fifth amendment exclusion-
ary rule include: Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v.
Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968);
Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d
998 (10th Cir. 1968).
2 See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 20, at 1214; Comment, Confession Taken in Viola-
tion of Miranda Rule Held Inadmissible For Impeachment Purposes, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 772,
777-78 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Confession Taken in Violation of Miranda]. The fifth
amendment exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated: "nor shall [any person] be
compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself. . . " U.S. CONST. amend.
V, whereas the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was judicially created by the Supreme
Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and later made applicable to the states
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 18 supra.
2 See Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Walder doctriTe
inapplicable to Miranda violations since Miranda explicitly commanded exclusion of all
statements obtained in violation of its guidelines); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 102 (2d
Cir. 1968) (defendant's statements held inadmissible when obtained after failure by police
to warn defendant of rights to counsel and silence); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172,
178 (9th Cir. 1968) (Miranda undermines Walder's application to fifth amendment viola-
tions).
21 The fourth amendment alone does not require exclusion of evidence obtained in disre-
gard of a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. Exclusion is required by either Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment in federal
prosecutions), or Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requires exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of fourth amendment in state proceedings).
21 See note 18 supra.
1979]
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than the trustworthiness of statements obtained through violation of
Miranda.3 0 A statement elicited from a defendant under pressure from
police officers may or may not be reliable. However, tangible evidence
obtained through an illegal search will be no different than evidence
taken in a search conducted in accordance with proper police procedures.
Physical evidence, unlike oral evidence, thus retains its accuracy regard-
less of how it is procured.31 The differences between the fourth and fifth
amendment exclusionary rules lead to the conclusion that the analogy
relied on by the Harris Court was inappropriate. Thus, statements ob-
tained following inadequate Miranda warnings should not, and indeed
may not, be used at trial for impeachment purposes. The Harris Court,
by allowing statements for impeachment purposes, gave new life to the
voluntariness test that Miranda was designed to replace. A statement
made following inadequate warnings may be used for impeachment pro-
vided it was made voluitarily.
32
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the scope of permissible police
practices after a defendant exercises his rights reveal further attempts to
limit the application of the Miranda decision. The Court was presented in
Oregon v. Hassu with the problem of how to treat statements obtained by
the police from a defendant who chose to exercise his right to counsel.3 In
Hass, an officer arrested the defendant at his home for the theft of two
bicycles. The officer then administered full Miranda warnings to the defen-
dant and drove him to the site of the robberies. While in the patrol car,
the defendant asked to call his attorney. The officer replied that he could
call as soon as they arrived at the station. The officer renewed his question-
ing, obtaining identification by the defendant of the two houses from which
he had stolen the bicycles."
At trial, the defendant's statements were used for the purpose of im-
peaching the defendant's credibility, and not as probative evidence of
guilt.36 Relying on Harris' sanction of the impeachment use of statements
elicited from a defendant after defective warnings, the Supreme Court held
that although Miranda precluded the use of such statements from the
prosecution's case-in-chief, the statements were properly admitted for
31 The Collateral Use Doctrine, supra note 20, at 930. Justice Powell stated in his con-
currence in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), that differences between evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth or fifth amendment require careful examination before a
doctrine applicable to one should be applied to the other. Id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring).
See Confession Taken in Violation of Miranda, supra note 26, at 776.
= 401 U.S. at 224. The voluntariness standard fails to acknowledge the inherent compul-
sion in custodial interrogation. The voluntariness standard therefore directly conflicts with
Miranda's command that statements obtained without adequate warnings cannot be prod-
ucts of the defendant's free will. 384 U.S. at 458.
= 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
Id. at 714-15. Miranda requires that interrogation must cease when the suspect exer-
cises his right to counsel. 384 U.S. at 474. There was no dispute in Hass that the facts
presented a violation of Miranda's guidelines. 420 U.S. at 721.
= State v. Haas, 267 Ore. 489, 490, 517 P.2d 671, 672 (1973).
420 U.S. at 717. The Hass Court determined that the Miranda guidelines were ambigu-
ous on the issue of whether statements obtained by police after the defendant requests counsel
should be barred from all uses at trial. Id. at 722.
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impeachment purposes.37 The Hass Codrt applied the Harris analysis to
the issues presented by the case before them and concluded that the only
factual distinction of consequence between the two cases was that full
warnings were administered to the defendant in Hass while the Harris
defendant received inadequate warnings.3 This difference, however, was
insufficient to preclude application of the Harris Court's reasoning. As in
Harris, the Hass Court determined that Miranda did not operate to bar
evidence obtained after a violation of Miranda's procedures for all pur-
poses.30 Similarly, Miranda was not to be used as a shield to allow the
defendant to commit perjury."0
The Hass opinion, because it adopted the reasoning of the Harris Court,
is subject to the same criticisms as Harris. Hass also holds that statements
that are to be used for impeachment must first meet the voluntariness
standard." Determining that the defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination in Hass was not violated, the Court allowed
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda's prophylactic guidelines to
impeach the defendant's testimony."2
1 Id. at 723-24. The Oregon Court of Appeal had reversed the trial court's conviction,
State v. Haas, 13 Ore. App. 368, 510 P.2d 852 (1973), apd the state supreme court affirmed
in State v. Haas, 267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973). The Oregon Supreme Court accepted
the Harris majority's conclusion that sufficient deterrence would result from exclusion of the
evidence from the case-in-chief when it was obtained after inadequate Miranda warnings.
Since the defendant in Haas had been given the full warnings, however, the Oregon court
deemed the Harris analysis inapplicable. The Oregon court concluded that once full warnings
had been given and the defendant exercised his right to counsel, the police would have a
strong incentive to violate Miranda's guidelines. 267 Ore. at 491, 517 P.2d at 673. The police
would not be inclined, the Oregon court reasoned, to give anything less than full warnings
because they would not want to risk losing the opportunity to gather evidence that could later
be used in the case-in-chief. Id.
After complete warnings are administered and the defendant requests a lawyer, however,
the police may have nothing to lose by resuming the interrogation. If the police complied with
Miranda, they probably would not elicit any more information from the defendant since
defense counsel will generally advise the defendant to remain silent. If the police choose to
resume the interrogation, however, they may at least obtain statements from the defendant
which could later be used for impeachment. Id. Therefore, the Oregon court concluded that
the need for deterrence is greater in the Haas circumstances than in the Harris situation
where inadequate warnings have been given. See generally Driver, Confessions and the Social
Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 42 (1968).
u 420 U.S. at 723. The Hass majority could not distinguish Harris and thus applied its
principles to the issues presented. Contrary to the Oregon Supreme Court, the Hass Court
concluded that if there were any differences in the deterrence levels generated by the Harris
and Hass situations, deterrence would be greater in the Hass instance. Id. The result, there-
fore, is that total exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is demanded less by
factual situations similar to that presented in Hass than by instances where incomplete
warnings were administered. Id.
" Id. at 722.
40 Id.
Al Id.; see Confession Taken in Violation of Miranda, supra note 26, at 776.
2 420 U.S. at 723-24. The description of the Miranda guidelines as merely prophylactic
was first used by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). The
defendant in Tucker was taken into custody, given inadequate Miranda warnings, and inter-
rogated about an alleged rape. Id. at 436. During the questioning, the police learned the
19791
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Michigan v. Mosley43 further limited Miranda's impact in situations
where statements are elicted from a defendant after he has chosen to
exercise his right to remain silent by failing to provide guidelines to deter-
mine when questioning may properly be renewed. The defendant in Mosley
was arrested in connection with a number of robberies in Detroit. The
defendant chose to exercise his right to remain silent. Thus, the interroga-
identity of a crucial witness for the prosecution. Prior to trial, the defendant unsuccessfully
moved to exclude the witness's testimony on the grounds that since the defendant had
received inadequate Miranda warnings before he identified the witness, not only were the
statements of the defendant inadmissible in the case-in-chief, but so were the statements of
the witness. The witness's statements, it was argued, should have been excluded as fruit of
the poisonous tree under the reasoning of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)
(evidence obtained through violation of fourth amendment inadmissible); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 343 (1939) (evidence obtained as a result of illegal wiretap inadmissible);
and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (subpoena issued on
basis of illegal search held invalid).
As framed by the Tucker Court, the issues were first, whether the lack of full warnings
had directly infringed upon the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination
or simply violated the "prophylactic" rules developed to protect that right, and second,
whether secondary evidence obtained absent adequate warnings must be excluded to deter
police misconduct and/or to prevent the use of unreliable evidence at trial. 417 U.S. at 439,
446, 448. Addressing the first issue, the Court concluded that the defendant's fifth amend-
ment rights had not been infringed since the facts in Tucker were too remote from the
traditional situations at which the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was
aimed. The Tucker majority reasoned that since Miranda's procedures were subject to con-
gressional and state changes, the guidelines set out by Miranda were not constitutionally
required. Id. at 444. The Court thus found that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had
no application to Tucker since the Court concluded that the doctrine only took effect after
constitutional violations. Id. at 445-50.
In analyzing the second issue, the Court quickly disposed of the reliability question
reasoning that the evidence in question was not elicited from a defendant under pressure but
obtained by questioning the defendant's uncoerced alibi witness. Regarding the deterrence
argument, the Court particularly emphasized that the defendant was questioned before
Miranda had been decided. Id. at 447. 'the police officers were guided at the time, therefore,
by an earlier Supreme Court decision, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The right to
appointed counsel warning that the officers in Tucker neglected to give was not required by
the Escobedo decision. See note 4 supra. Since the officers could not possibly have known
that additional warnings would soon be required, deterrence would not be achieved by exclud-
ing the evidence from trial. 417 U.S. at 447-48.
Several lower federal courts and numerous state courts had applied the poisonous tree
doctrine before the Tucker decision to exclude secondary evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Pellegrini, 309 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (physical
evidence obtained as a result of statements made by defendant without Miranda warnings
inadmissible); United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (recorded state-
ment of defendant inadmissible since it resulted from interrogation following inadequate
Miranda warnings); People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457 P.2d 841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969)
(en banc) (physical evidence obtained through illegally conducted interrogation inadmissi-
ble); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) (en banc) (oral confession obtained
after interrogation absent Miranda warnings inadmissible); People v. Paulin, 33 App. Div.
2d 105, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 883 (1969) (tangible evidence obtained as a result of unconstitutional
police procedures-no warnings given-inadmissible); see Note, Miranda Without Warning:
Derivative Evidence As Forbidden Fruit, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 325, 332 (1974).
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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tion, in accordance with Miranda guidelines, immediately ceased.,, Later
that evening, the defendant was taken to another room and again given
his warnings. The defendant then read and signed a notification form of
his rights designed to show a knowing and intelligent waiver. The defen-
dant was subsequently questioned concerning a different crime. After ini-
tially denying any participation, the defendant made some incriminating
statements in response to the officer's false remark that another partici-
pant had named the defendant as the "shooter." 5 These incriminating
statements were later used against the defendant at his murder trial as
evidence of guilt.
The Miranda decision did not clearly defime permissible police prac-
tices after a defendant halts interrogation by exercising his right to remain
silent." Although the majority stated that the interrogation must cease,
Miranda offers no explicit guidelines for determining when questioning
may resume. The Mosley majority stated that Miranda certainly could not
bar all subsequent questioning, nor could it stand for the proposition that
only a momentary delay would be necessary before the interrogation could
resume. 7 The former alternative, the Court reasoned, would defeat legiti-
mate police procedure, while the latter would defeat Miranda's attempt to
dispel the inherent compulsion of custodial knterrogation.1"
The Mosley Court concluded that Miranda must have meant to allow
renewed questioning, but determined that before questioning can be re-
sumed the defendant's right to remain silent must be "scrupulously ho-
nored.""9 By "scrupulously honored," the Mosley majority intended that
" Id. at 97. Miranda states that without the right to cut off questioning, custodial
interrogation operates to overcome the defendant's free will after he-has once invoked his right
to remain silent. 384 U.S. at 474. At this point, any statement obtained from the defendant
is presumed to be the result of compulsion. Id.
423 U.S. at 98.
a Initially, Miranda is easily applied if the defendant asks for counsel; interrogation
should cease until the attorney arrives. 384 U.S. at 474. Unlike the situation where an attor-
ney is requested, there is no definite point at which interrogation may resume once a defen-
dant has exercised his right to remain silent.
11 The Mosley majority contended that a blanket prohibition of further questioning
would transform the Miranda guidelines into meaningless barriers to legitimate police inves-
tigative activity and also prevent defendants from making intelligent assessments of their
position. 423 U.S. at 102.
384 U.S. at 444-45.
" 423 U.S. at 103. By choosing an intermediate course on the issue of when questioning
may be resumed, the Mosley Court followed the approach taken by federal circuits which had
already considered the issue. See, e.g., Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974) (state-
ment obtained from defendant in second interrogation admissible when one and one-half hour
gap between interrogation sessions and each preceded by full warnings); United States v.
Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972) (interrogation must
cease until new and adequate warnings have been given and there is a reasonable basis for
inferring that the suspect has voluntarily changed his mind); Massimo v. United States, 463
F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973) (police have privilege of asking
defendant to reconsider his initial refusal to talk); Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 868 (1968) (statements gained from second interrogation
admissible when defendant's request to stop earlier session immediately honored and defen-
dant in custody for one hour).
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all of the circumstances of both interrogations would be viewed to deter-
mine whether the defendant's right to remain silent had been fully re-
spected." The factors which influenced the Court to conclude that the
defendant's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" in Mosley
included the amount of time elapsed between interrogation sessions, 5' the
second interrogation session concerned a different crime from the first,5
and the interrogations were conducted by different police officers.
53
The Court's solution of the problem presented by Mosley leaves several
issues unresolved. These problems arise because the Mosley Court applied
the "scrupulously honored" test only to the facts presented. That is, the
Court's "scrupulously honored" test provides no concrete guidelines for
lower courts to resolve the issue of precisely when interrogation may be
resumed. Inconsistent results are the likely products in lower courts evalu-
ating cases on a totality of the circumstances approach. 4 However, the
case-by-case approach suggested by the Mosley Court is consistent with
the Miranda voluntariness test that also relied on the totality of the cir-
cumstances. The lower courts similarly must determine whether the
"scrupulously honored" test should apply only in situations where the
defendant has chosen to remain silent or if the scope of the test is meant
to include the situation where the defendant exercises his right to counsel
but questioning resumes before the attorney arrives. 55 The Mosley Court
never considered the possibility of allowing statements which did not meet
the "scrupulously honored" test for impeachment purposes. The issue did
423 U.S. at 104.
1, Id. at 106. More than two hours elapsed between interrogation sessions.
2 Id. at 105. The first interrogation dealt with recent Detroit robberies while the second
session concerned a robbery-murder case. The majority opinion, in discussing the homicide
case and the robberies, described the murder as "a crime different in nature and in time and
place of occurrence from the robberies for which Mosley had been arrested and interrogated
by Detective Cowie." Id. The dissent, however, noted that the two "different" crimes were
actually related since the informant's tip which led to the defendant's arrest encompassed
both the robberies which were the subject of the first interrogation and the robbery-murder
which was the topic of the later session. Id. at 118-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 104. The fact that the interrogations were conducted by two different officers
has little bearing on whether the defendant's right to remain silent was scrupulously honored.
The two interrogators could actually complement each other's performance in order to per-
suade the defendant to waive his rights. See 384 U.S. 452. See generally Note, Renewal Of
Interrogation After Assertion Of The Right To Remain Silent, 81 DIcK. L. Rav. 661 (1977).
m Note, Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional Procedure, 54 N.C.L. REv. 695, 703-
04 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1978) (statements
obtained from defendant held incommunicado for five hours with police making frequent
interrogation attempts ruled inadmissible); United States v. Finch, 557 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977) (statements admitted when defendant's request to stop first
interrogation promptly observed and second interrogation not until twenty hours later);
United States v. Koch, 552 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1977) (statements from second interrogation
admissible when defendant's right to silence initially honored six hours earlier).
For an example of a case which applied Mosley's scrupulously honored test to state-
ments obtained after a defendant requested counsel, see United States v. Nixon, 571 F.2d
1121 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant's right to counsel not scrupulously honored when interroga-
tion resumed shortly after demand for counsel).
[Vol. XXXVI
MIRANDA DOCTRINE
not arise since the prosecution in Mosley presented the defendant's state-
ments as evidence of the defendant's guilt. If statements are obtained after
the defendant's right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored,"
the court must decide whether the violation went to the defendant's fifth
amendment right or only to Miranda's prophylactic guidelines. Exclusion
of the statements, to be consistent with Harris and Hass, would be neces-
sary only if the Court concludes that the breach of a defendant's right to




Although Mosley did not face the issue of whether statements which
were obtained after a defendant's right to remain silent was not
"scrupulously honored" could be used for impeachment, statements which
may be used for impeachment force the defendant to make the choice of
whether or not to testify. If the defendant elects to testify, the prosecution
will be free to introduce the impeaching evidence. The danger is that the
jury will be unable to limit its use of the evidence to weighing the credibil-
ity of the defendant, and will treat it as evidence of the defendant's guilt
or innocence.57 On the other hand, a decision not to take the stand is often
viewed by the jury as evidence of the defendant's guilt.58
The Miranda decision has been further restricted by the Supreme
Court in the area of custodial interrogation." In Beckwith v. United
States,6" a criminal tax investigation of the defendant led to a meeting
between two agents of the Internal Revenue Service and the defendant at
his home. The agents questioned the defendant without administering
Miranda warnings."' The questioning was conducted in an atmosphere
described as "friendly" and "relaxed."62 After a short time the senior agent
made a request to inspect some of the defendant's records at his office. The
defendant complied with the request after being told by the agent that he
was not required to furnish any books or records. The government later
introduced statements for its case-in-chief that had been obtained through
the interrogation at the defendant's home.
54' See text accompanying notes 12-42 supra.
*1 See Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained Statement for Impeachment Purposes, 85
HRv. L. REv. 44, 48 n.27 (1971).
11 A decision not to take the stand may be highly prejudicial to the defendant. The
tendency for jurors is to believe that the defendant is probably guilty or concealing damaging
evidence when he chooses not to testify. See Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29
N.Y.B.A. BuLL. 86, 41-42 (1957); Note, To Take the Stand or Not Take the Stand: The
Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROS. 215, 221-22
(1968). The Supreme Court, in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), held that the
defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination precludes any comment upon
a defendant's refusal to take the stand. Id. at 615.
41 See note 3 supra.
425 U.S. 341 (1976).
The Beckwith interrogation did not, however, take place without any warnings to the
defendant. The Internal Revenue Agents administered warnings much like those required by
Miranda with the exception that the IRS warnings contained no warning of the defendant's
right to appointed counsel. Id. at 343.
62 Id.
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The defendant argued that the agents' questioning placed him under a
psychological restraint which was the legal equivalent of custody. 3 The
atmosphere surrounding the Beckwith questioning, however, was held by
the Court to be less than custodial. The majority reasoned that the defen-
dant had not been in the sort of custodial situation contemplated by
Miranda, and therefore no warnings were required." In evaluating whether
the defendant was in custody, the Court in Beckwith applied an objective
test." The test used by the majority requires that the officer must say or
do something which communicates to the suspect that he is not free to
leave in order for the interrogation to be considered custodial.6 The alter-
native subjective test, which some lower courts had previously applied,
hinged on the suspect's stdte of mind. If he considered himself restrained,
the interrogation would be deemed custodial and Miranda warnings would
be required. 7 The no custody determination in Beckwith accords with the
83 Id. at 345. The defendant in Beckwith also argued that Miranda guidelines applied
since he had become the focus of the criminal investigation. Id. The focus argument relied
on a footnote in the Miranda opinion attempting to clarify the meaning of custodial interroga-
tion which stated "this is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation
which had focused on an accused." 384 U.S. at 444 n.4. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) held inadmissible confessions obtained from a defendant under arrest, without first
allowing the defendant to consult with retained counsel. Prior to Escobedo, the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel did not apply until after indictment. See Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Escobedo majority reasoned that a pre-indictment interrogation in
a criminal prosecution may be as critical a stage as indictment. 378 U.S. at 486. Therefore,
the Escobedo Court held that once an investigation has come to focus on an accused, the
suspect has the right to consult his lawyer. Id. at 492. Thus, the defendant in Beckwith argued
that the Miranda footnote concerning focus should be interpreted to mean that a suspect is
under custodial interrogation whenever he is asked questions after the investigation has come
to focus upon the particular individual.
In asserting his focus argument, the defendant relied heavily on Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1 (1968). The defendant in Mathis had become the focus of a criminal tax investiga-
tion while the defendant was imprisoned on another charge. Id. at 2. Since the Mathis
defendant was clearly in custody, he was entitled to Miranda warnings. The focus element,
however, was irrelevent because the incarceration automatically triggered the necessity of the
warnings. 425 U.S. at 347.
" 425 U.S. at 347. Beckwith followed the great weight of authority in rejecting the focus
test to determine the applicability of the Miranda warnings. See, e.g., United States v.
Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 342 (1973); United States v. Stri-
bling, 437 F.2d 765, 771 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. Prud-
den, 424 F.2d 1021, 1027-28 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v.
Brevick, 422 F.2d 449, 450 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970); Pittman v. United
States, 411 F.2d 635, 638 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 914 (1969). But see United States
v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974) (pre-Beckwith case upholding focus test subsequently
overruled by United States v. Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1976)).
425 U.S. at 344.
" See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970) (defendant's exculpatory statement in response to questioning held admissible even
though FBI agents knew they could place defendant under arrest).
91 See United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (statements
obtained from parolee who erroneously believed he had no choice but to comply with officer's
request for questioning held inadmissible). For a case that considers both the subjective
outlook of the defendant and the objective intent of the interrogating officer in making the
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weight of authority that questioning which takes place in the defendant's
home is generally non-custodial. 61 Since the defendant is in his home,
presumably he is more at ease and is not exposed to the inherently coercive
pressures present at the station house which Miranda was designed to
protect against.69
The Supreme Court's holding in Oregon v. Mathiason70 raises the ques-
tion of the effect that should be given to the inherent coerciveness of
station house interrogations. An officer investigating a burglary left his
card at the defendant's home with a note asking him to call. The following
day the defendant, a parolee, arranged a meeting with the officer at the
state patrol headquarters. Upon arrival, the officer advised the defendant
that he was not under arrest. The officer informed the defendant that he
wanted to talk with him about a burglary and that the defendant's truth-
fulness would be considered by the judge or district attorney if any charges
were brought.7 The officer falsely stated that the defendant's fingerprints
had been found at the scene of the burglary. 2 No Miranda warnings were
given prior to questioning, during which the officer elicited incriminating
statements from the defendant which eventually resulted in the defen-
dant's conviction.
Recognizing that the station house visit did create a coercive environ-
custody determination, see Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The
Miranda Court's concern for inherent coercion suggests a subjective determination for cus-
tody, but the apparent difficulties in applying the subjective test lead most courts to employ
an objective determination. See Smith, The Threshold Question In Applying Miranda: What
Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. Rzv. 699, 714 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Smith].
" See, e.g., United States v. Lacy, 446 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally Smith,
supra note 67, at 719-22. The vast majority of tax investigation cases also reached the conclu-
sion that questioning which takes place in the suspect's home is noncustodial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); United
States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); United
States v. Ramantanin, 452 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d
415 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1970). The rationale of this conclusion is that little deprivation of freedom results
from criminal tax investigations and therefore there is little opportunity for coercion. Note,
Interrogation -Statements Obtained By IRS Special Agents During The Course Of A Noncus-
todial Interview With Taxpayer Under'Criminal Tax Investigation Are Admissible A t Subse-
quent Tax Fraud Trial Even Though The Agents Did Not Give Full Miranda
Warnings-Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), 17 SANTA CLARA L. Rzv. 716, 720
(1977). See generally Andrews, The Right To Counsel In Criminal Tax Investigations Under
Escbbedo And Miranda: The "Critical Stage'" 53 IowA L. Rav. 1074 (1968); Comment,
Taxpayer Rights in Noncustodial IRS Investigations After Beckwith v. United States, 10 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 297 (1977).
", Smith, supra note 67, at 719. But see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In Orozco,
four police officers arrived at defendant's boardinghouse at 4:00 a.m., to question him about
a murder earlier that evening. According to one of the officers, the moment the defendant
gave his name, he was under arrest. Id. at 325. The Court held that the defendant was in
custody despite the fact that the interrogation took place in his bedroom. Id. at 327.
70 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
11 Id. at 493.
n Id.
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ment for the defendant, the Mathiason majority nevertheless held the
questioning did not amount to custodial interrogation." Because the defen-
dant was free to leave, the Mathiason majority determined that he was not
in custody and therefore no warnings were required.74 This simple analysis
narrows the Miranda requirement that warnings be given to not only those
who are physically in custody, but also to those individuals who have been
deprived of their freedom in any significant way.75 The Court reasoned that
almost all police questioning involves an element of coerciveness, but a
coercive environment alone does not determine the custody issue. The
Mathiason opinion overlooked two crucial facts in determining that the
defendant was not in custody. Initially, the officer's false statement that
the defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene of the burglary was
deemed by the Court to be irrelevant to the custody determination. 76
Miranda, however, was designed to help protect the defendant against
trickery. 71 Secondly, as emphasized in Justice Stevens' dissent, the defen-
dant was a parolee at the time of the interrogation. 8 A parolee may be
viewed as a person who is always in custody.79 If this view is accepted, the
parolee who is questioned must always be given his Miranda warnings
before the interrogation may begin. In contrast to this approach, Justice
Stevens' dissent raises the possibility that the parolee defendant deserves
less fifth amendment protection than the nonparolee defendant." The
parolee's situation may be seen as resembling that of an incarcerated
" Id. at 495. Cases prior to Mathiason which involve station house "visits" generally hold
that the defendant is not under custodial interrogation defined by Miranda. See, e.g., United
States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant told he was robbery suspect but
given no indication that he would not be free to leave at any time, and defendant did freely
walk out of station); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant
told he was not under arrest and could terminate interview at any time); Freje v. United
States, 408 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969) (defendant under no
compulsion to go to station house). But see Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307, 310 (1st Cir.),
vacated, 403 U.S. 939 (1971) (defendant came to station voluntarily, however, subjective
intent of investigating officer was that defendant would not be free to go).
7' 429 U.S. at 495.
7 See note 3 supra.
7' 429 U.S. at 495-96.
n The Miranda Court reasoned that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege." 384 U.S. at 476. Such statements, obtained without waiver were to be
excluded from trial. Id. This presumes, however, that the defendant is under custodial inter-
rogation since Miranda warnings are only necessary after this point. Id. at 444. Therefore,
when the Miranda Court dealt with the waiver issue, it was concerned with an individual
already assumed to be under custodial interrogation.
7' 429 U.S. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7' Id. at 500. A parolee is technically under custody until he has served his sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 4210(a) (1976); see United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(applied subjective test for determining custody to parolee). See generally Comment,
Probation Officer Interrogation Of An In-Custody Probationer: An Analysis Of The Applica-
bility Of The Miranda Doctrine And The Voluntariness Standard, 10 U.S.F.L. Rav. 441
(1976).
1* 429 U.S. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individual who has very limited rights.81 This view leads to the conclusion
that the parolee in Mathiason was not in custody. The Mathiason major-
ity, by ignoring the parolee status of the individual and the officer's false
statement concerning fingerprints, evaded a strong argument for the ne-
cessity of administering Miranda warnings to the defendant.
Mathiason purports to serve as a guideline for lower courts faced with
a custody determination. However, since the Mathiason Court decided
only that the factual situation presented did not require Miranda warn-
ings, lower court decisions are likely to produce inconsistent results in this
area. Lower courts will have to compare the Mathiason facts to each case
to determine whether or not the questioning was custodial. 2 Thus, the
Mathiason opinion is subject to the same criticism aimed at the
"scrupulously honored" test articulated in Mosley. Neither case outlined
workable parameters to which the lower courts could look for guidance.
The lessening impact of Miranda has encouraged new criticism to be
aimed at the 1966 opinion. The response of the Supreme Court in the
recent decision of Brewer v. Williams" avoided pleas by the states to
overrule Miranda. The defendant in Brewer was arrested in Davenport,
Iowa, for abducting a ten-year-old girl in Des Moines. The defendant con-
sulted attorneys in both cities who advised him to remain silent. His Des
Moines attorney also agreed with the officers responsible for driving the
defendant to Des Moines that there would be no questioning until the
defendant had returned and had an opportunity to consult his attorney.u
Several times during the 160-mile trip to Des Moines, the defendant dem-
onstrated his unwillingness to be questioned by' advising the officers that
he would tell the whole story only after he returned to Des Moines and met
with his attorney. Nevertheless, one of the officers maintained a running
conversation with the defendant." Aware of the defendant's mental insta-
bility and his religious convictions, the officer tried to elicit information
concerning the crime by playing upon these personal characteristics of the
defendant.88 The officer then delivered a short speech to the defendant
KI See generally Gurfein, The Federal Courts Look At Parole, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 223
(1975).
'* See, e.g., United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lewis,
556 F.2d 446 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977). In United States v. Jordan, 557
F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1977), however, the court identified four factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant is in custody. The factors are: probable cause to arrest;
subjective intent of the police (whether the police believe the defendant is free to go); subjec-
tive intent of the defendant; and whether the investigation has focused on the defendant. Id.
at 1083. Without limiting Miranda, these factors provide the courts with a more concrete test
for determining custody than the Mathiason majority's continued case-by-case approach.
- 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
m Id. at 391. The defendant's lawyer explicitly repeated to one of the officers that the
officer was not to question the defendant during the return trip to Des Moines. Id. at 391-92.
'Id.
Id. at 399. The Court concluded that there was no doubt that the officer was trying to
subtly elicit as much incriminating evidence as he could from the defendant while en route
to Des Moines. Id. The defendant had been a mental patient until he escaped six months
prior to the murder. The officer was aware of this and therefore designed his interrogation
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indicating that the defendant might be the only person who could locate
the body." The officer told the defendant that he need not respond, but
should think about the matter as they were driving. 8 The defendant pro-
ceeded to incriminate himself by directing the officers to various points off
of the main highway to look for articles of clothing worn by the victim, and
finally, the body itself.5 '
The defendant argued that the evidence obtained during the trip to Des
Moines must be excluded to avoid violations of his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination as well as his sixth amendment right to counsel.
The defendant's fifth amendment argument for reversal was based on
Miranda. The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence should have been
excluded but rested its holding solely on the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel."
The fact that the Supreme Court's decision was not based on Miranda
was not inadvertent. Not only had the federal district and circuit courts
relied on Miranda for their holdings,"' but twenty-two states had filed
amicus curiae briefs with the Court asking that Miranda be overturned.
92
The Brewer case raises questions concerning the future of the Miranda
doctrine in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify and resolve numerous
technique to take advantage of the defendant's mental condition as well as his known reli-




430 U.S. at 397-98. See generally Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court considered the protection of
the right to counsel in post indictment situations. The defendant in Massiah was indicted
on a drug charge and retained a lawyer. After being released on bail, the police succeeded in
covertly eliciting incriminating responses from the defendant outside the presence of counsel.
Id. at 202-03. The Court held that the defendant had been denied his right to counsel when
the incriminating statements were used against him at trial. Id. at 206. Therefore, once a
defendant arranges for counsel, the prosecution may not interrogate the defendant outside
the presence of his attorney unless the defendant clearly waives his right to counsel. The
Brewer Court found the circumstances of Massiah to be analogous to the factual situation in
Brewer. 430 U.S. at 400. Thus, the statements elicited from the defendant before his return
to Des Moines were inadmissible against the defendant at trial.
11 Id. at 397. Both the federal district court and the circuit court partially based their
decisions in Brewer on Miranda grounds. 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974); 509 F.2d 227
(8th Cir. 1975). The district court held that the incriminating information had been elicited
from the defendant in violation of the Miranda doctrine. 375 F. Supp. at 179. The defendant
effectively asserted his right to remain silent by telling the officers that he would tell the
whole story after the return trip. Therefore, under Miranda, the interrogation should have
ceased. Id. at 180. Once the defendant exercised his right to remain silent, the interrogation
should have stopped. Id.; see 384 U.S. at 473-74. Since the interrogation did not stop, the
incriminating evidence was required to be excluded. 375 F. Supp. at 185. The circuit court
adopted the district court's application of the Miranda doctrine to the particular facts of
Brewer. 509 F.2d at 233-34.
430 U.S. at 389.
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ambiguities that have arisen regarding Miranda. Through these attempts,
the Court has narrowed Miranda's impact by limiting its scope. Miranda's(
full effect is no longer felt if inadequate warnings are given to the. defen-
dant or if an officer elicits statements from a defendant who has already
requested counsel." In these situations, instead of excluding the state-
ments altogether, the previously abandoned voluntariness test has been
invoked to test whether such statements obtained in violation of Miranda,
and inadmissible in the case-in-chief, may be used to impeach the defen-
dant if he chooses to take the stand. Unfortunately, the voluntariness test
undermines Miranda's basic premise by failing to take into consideration
the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation. The Court's decision
in Mathiason further lessens the scope of Miranda in determining when
the warnings are necessary." The Mathiason majority required nothing
less than custody before warnings are mandated, ignoring the guidelines
set forth by the Miranda opinion which include both the situation where
the individual is in custody as well as the instance where the person has
been deprived of his freedom in any significant way.
The post-Miranda cases evidence a decline of the impact of the original
decision. The Court has continually attempted to resolve ambiguities to
narrow Miranda rather than to broaden the scope of the decision. The best
example of this is in the impeachment area. The Court interpreted the
Miranda opinion as unclear regarding the extent to which statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda could be used at trial. Analogizing a fourth
amendment doctrine, the Court concluded that Miranda did not act as a
total bar and that statements obtained absent adequate warnings could
indeed be used for limited impeachment purposes. 5 This reasoning was
further approved by the Hass Court which allowed statements elicited
from a defendant after his request for counsel to be used for impeachment
purposes." The future of Miranda is still uncertain, as witnessed by the
Court's failure to face the Miranda issue in Brewer, but it is quite clear
that the Miranda decision no longer functions with full force.
MALcOLM S. DoRms
See text accompanying notes 12-42 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 70-82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 12-32 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
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